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CASENOTES

Harris v. Thigpen: Segregating HIVPositive Inmates in the Alabama
Correctional System
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Harris v. Thigpen,' the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals largely
upheld an Alabama statute2 which requires that all incoming prison inmates in correctional facilities be tested for sexually transmitted diseases,
including the presence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus disease
("HIV disease").3 Carmen Harris, an inmate in the Alabama Correctional
System whose tests showed the presence of HIV disease, brought this action challenging the mandatory testing and forced segregation from the
general prison population of inmates who tested positive.' On appeal,
plaintiff brought three constitutional challenges and a statutory challenge: the inadequate medical care provided to HIV-positive inmates violated the Eighth Amendment;' the segregation of HIV-positive inmates
from the general population violated the constitutional right to privacy;6
the inadequate library privileges denied the HIV-positive inmates their
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
ALA. CoDE § 22-11A-17(a) (1990).
HIV disease is an early stage of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS").
941 F.2d at 1500.
Id. at 1501.
Id.
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constitutional right of access to the courts;7 and the exclusion from general population activities violated 29 U.S.C. § 794, commonly referred to
as the Rehabilitation Act ("section 504").1 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's decision, holding that neither the Eighth Amendment's
right to adequate medical care nor the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy had been violated, and remanded the case for further findings of
fact on the issues of access to court and section 504.1
This Casenote begins with a brief background of HIV testing and how
correctional facilities have coped with HIV disease.10 It then examines the
challenges plaintiff brought as applied in other cases and surveys challenges brought in similar situations." Finally, the Casenote .examines and
analyzes the case itself.2
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

3
HIV Disease in the CorrectionalSetting-General Facts'

"AIDS is a serious communicable disease that undermines -the human
body's immune system. It makes the individual susceptible to a range of
'opportunistic' infections, malignancies, and other diseases which would
not generally be life-threatening to persons with normally functioning immune systems." 4 Opportunistic secondary infections which often prove
fatal include pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, HIV dementia, wasting syndrome, extrapulmonary tuberculosis, and esophogeal
candidiasis." Even though the diagnosis and treatment of HIV disease
has progressed substantially, no cure or vaccine exists.' s
7. Id. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not devote much attention to the access to
courts claim, which it remanded for further findings, this Casenote will not explore the viability of an access to courts claim for someone who has been segregated from the general
prison population. The ramifications of the access to courts claim cannot be fully addressed
until the trial court has had time to decide the issue.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1528.
10. See infra text.accompanying notes 13-78.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 79-198.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 199-263.
13. This Casenote, unless quoting directly, will use the commonly preferred term of HIV
disease. The term will refer to all stages of HIV. While the term may be an oversimplification, its advantage far outweighs its simplification. With the use of the term, the different
stages of HIV from infection to "full-blown" AIDS, which are difficult to diagnose, will not
have to be discussed.
14. THEODORE M. HAMMETT, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (3d
ed. 1988).
15. Id. See also Professor Sidney Watson, Untitled, February 27, 1991, infra note 30.
16. Hammett, supra note 14, at 3.
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HIV disease was first detected in the United States in 1981 when previously healthy homosexual men contracted pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. 7 After considerable study, researchers found the cause of HIV disease to be the HIV virus, a retrovirus that reverses the normal
information flow between the genetic materials DNA and RNA. s The abnormal flow of information lowers the number of white blood cells (or T4cells) available to ward off infection."
HIV disease, among other things, is transmitted by blood, semen, and
vaginal fluid passed during sexual intercourse; illegal intravenous drugs
injected through contaminated needles; and HIV-positive blood mistakenly used in transfusions. 20 Research indicates that HIV disease cannot
be contracted through casual contact, non-sexual bodily fluids, feces, or
insect bites."' Additionally, incidents of infection by accidental needle
sticks, or contact with open wounds or mucous membranes of an infected
person, are extremely low. 2 2 HIV disease is not solely a homosexual dis-

23
ease; heterosexuals can also be infected.
The incubation period for "full-blown" HIV disease is not precisely
known. "One can be infected with HIV for years, possibly even -indefinitely, without ever developing symptoms. However, asymptomatic (as
well as symptomatic) persons can transmit the infection.' 4 While symptoms usually become manifest in five to seven years, some researchers
have suggested that no upper limit exists.2 The long incubation period
poses a significant problem for the individual and society since it is impossible to
predict when the infected individual will manifest
2s

symptoms.

A number of tests have been developed to determine the presence of
the HIV virus. The first test developed was the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay ("ELISA"), designed to detect the presence of the HIV
virus in the nation's blood supply.2 7 "[ELISA] is not a test for AIDS, nor

does it even detect the presence of the virus itself-only the presence of
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 14-16.
22. Id. at 13-14. "In three studies totaling 435 health-care workers with open-wound or
mucous-membrane exposure to the blood of known HIV-infected patients, none became infected as a result of these exposures." Id. While this may be the case, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") has warned that a possibility of infection exists. Id.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6-7.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 4.
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antibodies to the virus" which are found in the blood and are the body's
attempt to ward off the infection. 8 Because of the long incubation period
for HIV disease, ELISA is not fool-proof.2 ' When an ELISA test detects
the presence of the HIV virus, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC")
recommends that a second ELISA test be administered. Then, a more
accurate confirmatory test, such as the Western Blot test, is administered.3 0 "When this'sequence of tests is used, the results have prove[d]
extremely accurate, with very few false positives." 1 However, in correctional systems, problems with the administration of the tests abound.
The main problem in the prison context is the false negative. 2 A false
negative occurs when test results indicate no presence of HIV disease in
the body when in fact HIV disease is present.ss Conversely, a false positive occurs when test results indicate the presence of HIV disease in the
body when in fact HIV disease is not present. 4 Varied testing procedures
and limited control over the testing facilities create conditions conducive
to generating false negatives.8 ' Because of the lack of standardized parameters used to indicate a positive response, the ELISA test is subject to
various interpretations."' Likewise, "[t]he Western Blot is particularly
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 4.
Several recent reports indicate that a small number of infected units of blood may
have slipped through undetected, because the donor was only recently infected
and antibodies had not had time to appear by the time the blood was donated.
However, the CDC estimates that only about 100 transfusion-associated infections
will occur annually out of a total of sixteen million units transfused.
Id.
30. Id. citing CDC, "Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody
Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS," MMWR, August 14, 1987; 36:510.
The Western Blot test identifies antibodies to proteins to protection of a specific
molecular weight and therefore helps to eliminate false positives. The HIV antigens are separated by electrophoresis (heating) and then blotted onto a special
paper. The transferred antigens are then exposed to test serum and any specific
antibodies present react with the specific antigen bands.
Professor Sidney Watson, Untitled, at 70 n.29 (February 24, 1991) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Mercer Law Review).
31. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1499 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991).
32. Hammett, supra note 14, at 61. In a population with a high risk of infection, false
negatives are a grave problem. Using Hammett's figures, assume that there are approximately 35,000 inmates in the state's correctional systems and that the actual number of
infected inmates would equal 30% (10,500). Provided that the testing efficiency equals
99.5% effectiveness, approximately 50 inmates would not be identified in the mass screening
program. Id. at 64.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 62. Minor variations in temperature and humidity adversely affect HIV antibody tests. Id.
36. Id. See infra note 60.
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susceptible to human error and variability of results because most laboratories use unlicensed test kits.""'
The economic realities of performing ELISA and Western Blot tests
also need to be considered. The ELISA test is inexpensive, costing two to
three dollars.8 8 However, the Western Blot test costs considerably more,
approximately one hundred dollars.8 8
Because of the high mortality rate-fifty-seven percent of infected patients have died-prevention of HIV disease is paramount to any strategy
of treatment. ' The risk of contracting HIV disease can be lessened
through the use of condoms, the cessation of needle-sharing between intravenous drug-users, and the use of "barriers" such as gloves and masks
in medical situations. 1
HIV disease has caused severe problems in the correctional setting
since 1983 when the Texas correctional system reported its first case. 42 In
1985, the number of infected prisoners in state prisons reached 420.48
Two years later, that figure had increased to either 1,650 4 or 1,964.48 Obviously, "[t]he HIV epidemic places
enormous stress on already
'46
overburdened correctional systems."
Incarcerated females with HIV disease have caused additional
problems for the correctional systems. "Even though women comprise
only nine percent of AIDS cases, they are the fastest growing population
to be affected by HIV disease.' ' Additionally, more entering females
*have HIV disease than males. 48 However, female prisoners receive less assistance. "While lack of medical care is a problem for most prisons and
jails in this country, appropriate medical care for women is even more
lacking. Women prisoners have long failed to receive even basic gynecological and medical services . . . . ' As such, seropositive 0 females pose
an additional challenge to an already overburdened correctional system.
37. Hammett, supra note 14, at 62.
38. Watson, supra note 30, at 8.
39. Id.
40.

Hammett, supra note 14, at 7.

41. Id. at 222-34 (discussing the various ways to prevent the spread of HIV disease in a
variety of settings).
42. 6 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 4 (Winter 1985).
43. Id. at 1.
44. 16 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 7 (Summer 1988).
45. James K. Stewart, Foreword to THEODORE M. HAMMETT, AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (3d ed. 1988).
46. Id.
47. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIDS, REPORT: HIV DISEASE IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
25 (1991) thereinafter "Report"].
48. Id.
49. Id. at 26.
50.

Seropositive refers to the presence of HIV infection in a person's blood.
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Correctional systems have tried two methods to relieve the stress
caused by the spread of HIV disease. The first method includes mass
testing of inmates coupled with the segregation of inmates who test positive." The systems of Alabama, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, West
Virginia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, among others, have implemented a mass screening program." As a general rule, "[m]ass screening
usually involves testing all [existing] inmates, all new inmates and/or all
inmates prior to release."" The primary justification for mass screening
and subsequent segregation of seropositive inmates from the general population is the need to protect seropositive inmates from any potential adverse treatment by the general prison population.' 4 Because medical information is not confidential in most prisons, the general population,
guards, and staff are likely to know who has tested positive for HIV disease. Therefore, seropositive inmates may be more likely to be attacked
and threatened." As one inmate said: "You can be hurt or killed if your
confidentiality is breached and other inmates find out especially since
this is a dormitory facility and there is not even the security of a locked
cell."s
While the justification for mass screening is laudable, serious practical
and constitutional problems arise. First, "[ilf the benefits of mass screening are to outweigh its disadvantages, then the program must offer highly
accurate and reliable [test] results.' 7 That is not always the case. The
time between contracting the disease and its appearance in an ELISA
antibody test can average six to twelve, weeks. Some evidence suggests
that the time can be considerably longer." As a result, segregating inmates may not prevent the transmission of the disease within the prison
walls." Second, technical problems in interpreting the test can produce a
large number of false positive results, and uninfected prisoners would also
be segregated." Third, no evidence supports the conclusion that mass
51. Hammett, supra note 14, at 59. The competing interests of the noninfected and the
infected underscore the controversy surrounding mass screening and segregation policies.
"While HIV-positive inmates want to remain in the mainstream of prison populations, those
not infected want protection from those who are." Nathan McCall, AIDS Toll Rising in
D.C. Jails; Better Care Sought for Afflicted Inmates, WASHINGTON POST, February 4, 1991
at D1.
52. Hammett, supra note 14, at 60.

53. Id. at 59.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
cated,

7 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 1, 4 (Spring 1986).
Id.
Report, supra note 47, at 4.
Hammett, supra note 14, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id. The ELISA test is measured on a spectrum with certain "cut-off" points demarwhich distinguish positive and negative results. When the ELISA test is used to
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screening and segregation is an effective way to prevent the transmission
of the disease." With the problems of false negatives and the disease's

considerable latent period, screening and segregation will only prevent
new infections if inmates are repeatedly tested. Fourth, the segregation

policy is replete with legal implications, including constitutional challenges based on the right to privacy, due process, equal protection, deliberate indifference in giving proper medical care, and unlawful search and

seizure." One inmate said: "I feel that incarceration is punishment for
the crime I committed, but to be incarcerated and then isolated from all
privileges afforded to other inmates who were convicted in the same
courtroom I was convicted in, is above the law.""8
The second method for coping with HIV disease in correctional facili-

ties includes educating and training inmates and'correctional staff about
HIV disease." "Education and training are particularly necessary because
of the prevalence of misinformation on AIDS." 5 Although HIV disease
cannot be contracted through "casual contact, "e many uninfected in-

screen a blood sample, the "cut-off" points are set low, since it is better to discard suspect
blood rather than use it. When the ELISA test is used to screen people, a low "cut-off"
point will produce a number of false positives. Although confirmatory tests may be used, a
chance for false positives or false negatives still exists. Either error has dire consequences.
The false positive inmate must suffer the mental anguish associated with the belief that one
has contracted a terminal disease. The false negative inmate is released into the general
prison population and could infect other inmates, effectively undermining the goal of nontransmission associated with a mass screening program. Id.
61. Id. at 65. See supra text accompanying. notes 27-39.
62. Laura J. Moriarity, AIDS in CorrectionalInstitutions: The Legal Aspects, 23 CirM.
L. BULL. 533, 536 (1987).

63. Report, supra note 47, at 3. Additionally, the inmate writes:
I learned that I'd tested positive for HIV on July[] 14, 1987. I was immediately
removed form [sic] trade school (barbering) boarded onto one of the state transportation vans and moved to L.C.F.'s AIDS Unit with all of the other inmates who
were HIV . Once in the AIDS unit I felt like an animal on display at the zoo ....
I am no longer allowed to take part in trade school, nor am I eligible to take part
in any of the D.O.C.'s early release programs ....

There are murders [sici, rap-

ists and to make matters worse, there are men on the [AIDS] unit with life sentence [sic) without parole, several life sentences, etc. with men who have 1, 2, 3, &
4 year sentences for petty crimes ....

For 6 years or so I'm expected to just sit

around a dormitory with approximately 140 other men and watch T.V ..... I live
in a very tense environment; it can be dangerous when 140 inmates lie around
with idle minds ....

Frankly, 90-95% of the negative treatment I have received

has come from D.O.C. officials. I come into contact with inmates in the prison's
general population and I have yet to ever be treated indifferently by an inmate
Id. at
64.
65.
66.

24-25.
Hammett, supra note 14, at 39.
Id.
Id. Se'e supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
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mates and correctional staff fear infection. 17 Correctional staff fear-infection through saliva transmitted by an aggressive inmate who bites a staff
member, through urine thrown or maliciously excreted, and through
blood spilled in a fight.6 8 This concern has led some staff members to
refuse to work with HIV diseased inmates.69 "In some jurisdictions, correctional officers' unions have filed grievances and threatened strikes over
the AIDS issue." 70
While misconceptions about the disease still exist, inmates and staff
alike are seeking more education." In.December 1987, forty percent of
the inmates in a New York prison signed up for voluntary HIV disease
education classes." As a result, risky behavior, such as the sharing of
needles, declined." Other states have distributed condoms to prevent additional infections.' 4 The National Commission on AIDS has recommended education and preventive activities, which may be the answer in
some jurisdictions." However, other jurisdictions have reported that after
implementing the educational programs, risky activities continue largely
unabated.70 One correctional facility official noted that inmates with long
sentences have no incentive to cease risky behavior, such as anal intercourse.7 Also, HIV disease education and training is expensive.78 In*tough
economic times, poorer states may cite expense as the reason for choosing
screening and segregation over education and prevention.
B. Legal Challenges
In the area of prisoner's rights; courts are extremely deferential to correctional officials. "[T]his attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention.""9 Because of grossly complex problems and ill-equipped court
systems,'" courts may lean toward upholding a prison regulation or statute even if a substantial prisoner right must be infringed.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77,
78.
79.
80.

Hammett, supra note 14, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
See infra note 252.
Report, supra note 47, at 18-20.
Hammett, supra note 14, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 397, 404 (1974).
Id. at 405.
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1. Eighth Amendment Challenges
Inmates segregated from the general prison population because of their
HIV disease status have raised Eighth. Amendment s ' challenges against
correctional systems. The inmates argue either that they are denied adequate medical care because of their seropositive status s" or that their segregation from the general prison population amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment."' Rejecting these assertions, some nonseropositive inmates
have brought challenges arguing that the placement of seropositive inmates in the general prison population amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment.
Medical Care. The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment." Originally, the Eighth Amendment concept
of "cruel and unusual punishment" was thought to apply only to cases of
physical torture. 85 However, the concept has evolved and should not be
confined to physical torture; it should be a flexible and dynamic standard
based on the evolution of society." This evolution has allowed inmates to
bring constitutional challenges based on inadequate medical care. In Estellg v. Gamble s8 the Court fashioned the standard that inmates complaining about medical care must meet to recover under a constitutional
claim.88 Relying on precedent, the Court said: "These elementary principles establish the government's obligation to provide medical care to
those whom it is punishing by incarceration." As a result, "deliberate
indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'", Prison doctors ignoring
medical situations and prison guards unnecessarily delaying an inmate's
access to medical care are examples of deliberate indifference.' 1 Not every
81. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 84-116.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 117-127.
84. Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 661, 669 (1962).
85. The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" first appeared in 1689 in the English
Bill of Rights. The Framers of the American Bill of Rights who adopted the English phrase
were concerned with proscribing certain physical torture and other barbarous punishment.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1975).
86. Id. at 171.
87. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 104.
91. Id.
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claim of inadequate medical care made by a prisoner states a valid claim
for a violation of the Eighth Amendment."
[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.
In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently3 harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.'
Before a court can find deliberate indifference to needed medical care,
it must determine whether medical care is needed at all. In Bowring v.
Godwin," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals formulated a three-part
test to determine when medical care is needed." Under this test, medical
treatment is mandated when a health care provider determines through
the exercise of ordinary care "that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a
serious' disease or injury; that such disease or injury is curable or may be
substantially alleviated; and that the potential for harm to the prisoner
by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial. ""6
Various courts, like the Fourth Circuit in Bowring, have defined deliberate indifference.' 7 Differing medical opinions will not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference." A medical decision not to order x-rays is a medical judgment, and even though the decision may be considered medical
malpractice, it will not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." "It
is not required that the medical care provided to a prisoner be perfect,
the best obtainable, or even very good." 100 However, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that a medical misdiagnosis that results from a
violation of the deliberate indifference standard is a factual question for
expert witnesses.10
92. Id. at 105.
93. Id, at 106.
94. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1971).
95. Id. at 47-48.
96. Id.
97. In Bass v. Sullivan, 550 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1977), the court said that in medical
care situations, the widely recognized standard of deliberate indifference is best, but another
standard could be used if the lack of medical care shocks the conscience or is intolerable to
fundamental fairness. Id. at 231. The Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), alluded
in a footnote that the two tests were basically the same. Id. at 105 n.14.
98. Brown v. Beck, 481 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
99. Id. at 726.
100. Id.
101. Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).
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102
In Wellman v. Faulkner,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that repeated episodes of negligent mistreatment combined with evidence
of general systemic deficiencies establishes the presence of deliberate indifference. 08 In Ramus v.Lamm,' 0 4 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
said: "In class actions challenging the entire system of health care, deliberate indifference to inmates' health needs may be shown by proving repeated examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by
1
the prison medical staff.''
In Ancata v. Prison Health Service,'" the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals further clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference. The
court held that intentional failure to provide service acknowledged as
needed but not performed is evidence of deliberate indifferene.107 In Ancata, a private contractor who provided medical care to a county's jails
prescribed only Tylenol and Ben Gay to a patient who had leukemia and
suggested further evaluations that were never made. Defendant contractor argued that it did not receive adequate funds from the county.101 Rejecting the inadequate funding argument, the court said: "Lack of funds
for facilities cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical
care and treatment for inmates."''
The Eleventh Circuit provided further guidance in Waldrop v. Evans.11 "A prison inmate has the right under the Eighth Amendment to
be free from deliberate indifference to serious physical or psychiatric
needs."' In the same year, the Ninth Circuit also held that merely providing access to medical care is not sufficient.' 1 2 If the medical care provided is inadequate, the court will find deliberate indifference even if a
health care worker has examined and diagnosed the prisoner."'
In Cameron v. Metcuz, 4 an inmate brought a deliberate indifference
challenge against prison officials for failing to protect the inmate from
attack by an HIV-infected inmate."' The court noted that while prison

102.
103.
104.
105.

715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 272.
639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 575.

106.
107.
108.
109.

769 F.2d 701 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 705.

110. 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989).

111. Id. at 1033.
112. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989).

113. Id.
114. 705 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Ind. 1989).

115. Id. at 456.
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officials may have been grossly negligent in failing to prevent the attack,
gross negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.1 6
Cruel and Unusual Punishment. A number of seropositive inmates
have tried, without success, to bring more traditional Eighth Amendment
claims based either on their segregation from the general prison population or the presence of seropositive prisoners in the general prison population. In dealing with these challenges, courts have used pre-HIV disease
ideas as a basis for their analysis.
In Newman v. State of. Alabama,"7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a state satisfies its Eighth Amendment obligations to prisoners
when it furnishes the prisoners with reasonably adequate necessities of
life."' The prisoners need not have every amenity of life thought necessary to avoid mental, physical, ,or emotional deterioration, provided the
state does not create conditions conducive to such deterioration.'
The
court held that the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated, and that segregation of the prisoner from the rest of the prison
population did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 2 0
The right of prisoners to be protected from threats, violence, or sexual
assaults by other prisoners allows state prison officials to segregate those
prisoners deemed dangerous.121 Continual segregation without notice or a
hearing concerning the reason for the segregation can run afoul of the
Due Process Clause.1 2 2 In Jackson v. Meachum,"2 an inmate who had
been deemed dangerous was denied communication with fellow inmates.
As a result, the inmate became depressed and despondent. 24 The court
held that the segregation did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, even though the segregation denied the inmate freedom of communication that arguably led to depression.12
Utilizing the same reasoning as the court in Jackson, the Southern District Court of New York in Cordero v. Coughlin"" held that segregating
HIV disease prisoners did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.1 27 Without any deprivation of adequate food, shelter, or clothing,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 459-60.
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id. at 286-87.
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980).
Jackson v. Meachum, 669 F.2d 578, 585 (1st Cir. 1983).
699 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 579.
Id. at 582-83.
607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 11.*
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inmates with HIV disease have little hope that segregation alone will support a cognizable cruel and unusual punishment claim.
2. Equal Protection
Seropositive inmates who have been segregated from the general popuprotection challenges. These challenges have
lation have also raised equal
s
met with little success.12

The first known case concerning a seropositive inmate segregated from
the general prison population was Cordero v. Coughlin.'" The court rejected the inmate's equal protection argument: "Because AIDS victims
are not similarly situated to other prisoners the Equal Protection Clause
simply does not apply here."" The court reasoned that even if non-HIV
disease prisoners and "disease-free" prisoners were similarly situated, the
HIV disease prisoners were not a "suspect" class and "therefore as long
as there is a legitimate government end and the means used are rationally
related to that end, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated."'' 3 The
court upheld the segregation on the basis of the state's objective: the
protection of prisoners with HIV disease and other prisoners from the
fears and supposed harms of the HIV virus.18 2 The court, writing in 1984,
realized that much was not known about the disease. Lack1 of knowledge
led the court to uphold the state's objective as legitimate. 33
In Powell v. Department of Corrections,'" a seropositive inmate
brought an equal protection challenge, arguing that the Department of
Corrections segregated him because of his homosexuality and not because
he had tested positive for the HIV virus. 1 5 Once again, the court held
that the state had a legitimate interest in segregating the inmate from the
general prison population.' The court characterized the legitimate interest as "prevent[ing] the possible spread of a deadly infectious disease and
[] protect[ing] Plaintiff from assault by other inmates."'187 Based on this
interest, the court upheld the segregation policy and found that the inmate was not treated differently from any other segregated inmate.8 8
128. For a more detailed equal protection analysis, see Roy G. Space, Jr., AIDS: Due
Process, Equal Protection,and the Right to Treatment, 4 IssuEs L. & MED. 283 (1988).
.129. 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 647 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
135. Id. at 971.
136. Id.
137, Id.
138. Id. The court's reasoninj seems to miss the point that plaintiff was attempting to
make. Plaintiff was arguing that he should not be treated differently from a member of the
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3. Due Process

Like equal protection challenges, due process challenges have also met
with little success. In Powell v.Department of Corrections,' 8 ' plaintiff
inmate brought, inter alia, a due process challenge against a policy of
segregating AIDS prisoners from the general population. 40 The court rejected the prisoner's contention that he had a constitutional right to remain in the general prison population and that he had any due process
claim.1 4 1 "As long as the conditions or degree of confinement is within the
purview of the sentence imposed on him and is not otherwise violative of
the [C]onstitution, the Due Process clause does not subject an inmate's
treatment by prison authorities to judicial review."14
4. Right to Privacy
Right to privacy challenges by seropositive inmates have been rare. It is
still unclear how the courts will decide these challenges.
In 1977, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of two privacy
interests in the Fourteenth Amendment." 48 "One is the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. '' 144 "The

concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' -145 Prisoners have asserted
their dual privacy rights with mixed success. In Houchins, Sheriff of the
County of Alameda, California v. KQED, Inc.,' 46 the Court held that although prisoners must have some rights restricted because of their status,
they nevertheless retain some rights to privacy. 47 Generally, privacy interests must be measured against any legitimate state objective. 4 8
The Court in Turner v. Safley14 9 defined the test for considering inmates' constitutional claims."50 The test is a "rationally related" test.
general prison population. Plaintiff was not arguing that he should not be treated differently
from other inmates who have been segregated.
139. 647 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
140. Id. at 970.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
144. Id.
145. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
147. Id. at 5 n.2.
148. See Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1973).
149. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
150. Id. at 89.
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"When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 151 The Court, in employing this low scrutiny test, clarified earlier
decisions by the district court and court of appeals that misconstrued the
Court's previous attempts to articulate a standard.""2 A low scrutiny test
is necessary if "'prison administrators . . ., and not the courts [are] to
make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.' 51
The Court listed several factors that should be used to determine what
causal relationship will be reasonable or rational. "First, there must be a
'valid, rational connection, between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.' " , Thus, the relationship between the governmental interest and the regulation cannot be
arbitrary or remote. 16 Second, the court should consider whether the
prisoner can exercise his rights in other ways.156 "Where 'other avenues'
remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, . . . courts should
be particularly conscious of the 'measure of judicial deference owed to
correction officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.' "157 If a
reasonable alternative will allow the prisoner to exercise the right, the
court may give this factor greater weight. Third, the court should evaluate the impact of accommodating the right on the correctional institution. " " If the effect is great, the court should defer to prison officials.' 5
Finally, "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." 1 0 "This is not a 'least restrictive alternative'
test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every
conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." 16
Most segregated seropositive inmates who have brought right to privacy challenges have argued that segregation itself has deprived them of
the right of disclosure, that is, the right 'to tell or not to tell about important happenings in their lives. In Cordero v. Coughlin,"2 seropositive inmates argued that segregation from other prisoners revealed that they

151.
152.
153,
(1977)).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 81. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128
Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1983)).
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1983)).
Id. at 90-91 (citing Block v.Rutherford, 486 U.S. 576, 587 (1983)).
607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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had contracted HIV disease.16 3 The district court rejected the argument
and held: "[Privacy] rights are limited by '[t]he fact of [a prisoner's] confinement and the needs of the penal institution.' ""6 Because New York
had a "legitimate" reason for segregating the inmates, it could abridge
the inmates' right to privacy.166
Other cases concerning HIV disease and privacy interests have met
with different results. In Woods v. White,'" a prisoner claimed that unauthorized disclosure of an inmate's HIV status by medical personnel to
non-medical personnel violated the inmate's right to privacy. The court
upheld this claim by denying defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.6 7 The court pointed out defendant's failure to state that disclosure served the public interest as a determining factor in its decision.' Because defendant could not show a legitimate public interest in
disclosing the inmate's condition, the inmate's privacy right did not have
to be balanced against a competing state interest.'' In Doe v. Coughlin,17 the court granted a' preliminary injunction to an inmate who alleged that prison officials violated his privacy rights by segregating seropositive inmates from the general prison population.' 7 ' "Within the
jurisprudence concerning the right to privacy, and in recognition of the
particularly personal nature of the information potentially subject to disclosure under the state's program, the court determines that the prisoners
subject to this program must be afforded at least some protection against
that non-consensual disclosure."' 72 The preliminary injunction was to remain in effect until findings could show that the prisoners had some
protection.'"
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id. (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125
(1977)).
165. Id. Decided prior to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the court in Cordero appears to use analysis similar to the first Turner factor.
166. 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
167. Id. at 877.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
171. Id. at 1243.
172. Id. at 1238 (citing accord Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988)).
173. Id. at 1243. In distinguishing Doe and Cordero (see supra note 162), one should
note the years in which the cases were decided. The advocates in Doe may have persuaded
the court in a way the advocates in Cordero could not. Because the HIV disease research
was in its infant stages in the early 1980s, the court in Cordero had to base much of its
reasoning on public misconception and fear.
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5. RehabilitationAct
Inmates who have brought section 504 Rehabilitation Act'"' actions
may be more successful than those who have brought constitutional challenges. To recover under section 504, an individual must (1) be disabled,
(2) be "otherwise qualified," (3) be denied access to a program which receives federal assistance, and (4) show that the failure to provide such
access subjects the individual to discrimination.'"7 A handicapped individual is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment."7 6 Major life activities include "functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."' 7'
Once properly classified as handicapped, one must still be "otherwise
qualified" before a court will entertain a section 504 action. To be "otherwise qualified," a handicapped person must meet the "essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of [the federally funded] services"17 and
must not be a significant health risk to others. However, if one can make
a reasonable accommodation that would protect others from any health
risk, enable the disabled person to participate in the federal program, and
not impose an undue hardship, one must make the accommodation."'
The Court in School Board of Nassau County, Floridav. Arline"' held
that the school board violated section 504 when it forced a school teacher
with recurring bouts of tuberculosis to quit her job.'"' This was the first
time that a court applied section 504 to someone whose disability was her
affliction with a contagious disease and its related physical impairments.
The Court, in following Department of Health and Human Services regulations on the definitions of handicap"' and physical impairment,"8 rejected appellant's argument that "the contagious effects of a disease can
174. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1991). For
purposes of this Casenote, I will refer to 29 U.S.C. § 794 as "section 504" or the "Rehabilitation Act."
175. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1991).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(i)-(iii) (1988).

177. 28 C.F.R.

§ 42.540(k)(2)(ii) (1991).

178. 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(C)(2) (1991).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1991); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1991).
180. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
181. Id. at 289. The Court affirmed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
and remanded on the issue of whether Arline was "otherwise qualified." Id.
182. Discussed supra text accompanying note 176.
183. 480 U.S. at 283 n.10. The regulations define physical impairment as: "[A]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; re-
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meaningfully distinguished from the physical effects on a claimant.

'184

However, the Court refused to hold that a person who has a contagious
disease without exhibiting physical symptoms would be handicapped
under section 504.18 Instead, the Court held that a person who exhibits

contagiousness and physical impairment may be handicapped and therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, remanding the case on

the issue of "otherwise qualified." 1s The Court's reasoning is unclear concerning whether a person who carries a contagious disease but exhibits no

physical impairment could take advantage of section 504.1s7
The Court left an unanswered question in Arline that Congress and

various lower courts (in later HIV disease cases) have answered. "It is
clear from the debate on the 1987 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act
that members of Congress assumed that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV [carriers] . .. were handicap[ped]
.",8
Additionally,
the Ninth Circuit, the Southern District of Florida, and the Central Dis-

trict of California have said that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

applies to people infected with HIV disease. 18 9 Furthermore, the 1987 Re-

habilitation Act amendment concerning the employment setting recognizes contagiousness as a handicap. 190 The Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") embodies the concept as well.1 1
While Congress and the courts have classified seropositive people as

"handicapped" within the meaning of section 504, seropositive people
may not be "otherwise qualified."11 92 If the seropositive person poses a
significant risk to others which cannot be eliminated through reasonable
spiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1991).
184. 480 U.S. at 282.
185. Id. at 289. "This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions
of whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a
physical impairment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act." Id. at 289 n.7.
186. Id. at 277, 282.
187. Id. at 282 n.7. The United States argued in its amicus brief that this should be the
result. The Court refused to rule on this issue because plaintiff was both physically impaired
and contagious, Id.
188. Watson, supra note 30, at 107 n.166 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. H574 (daily ed. March 2,
1988)). "[Slection 504 and the decisions that have addressed infectious diseases . . . have
made it clear that people with AIDS and HIV infections are protected ....
Id. (statement
of Representative Waxman).
189. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Shuttleworth v.
Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School
District, 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Ca. 1987).
190. Watson, supra note 30, at 32-33; 29 U.S.C. § 706 (8)(c)(v) (Supp. 1991).
191. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(a)-(c) & 12102(b) (1991).
192. Watson, supra note 30, at 32.
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measures, section 504 will bar that person from recovery under the Rehabilitation Act. 1 "3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only court thus far that has
specifically stated that section 504 applies to prison programs which receive federal funds. In Bonner v. Lewis,'" a deaf inmate brought a section 504 claim against prison officials for failing to provide the inmate
with a qualified sign language interpreter. 195 The court rejected the prison
official's argument that Congress never intended for section 504 to apply
to prisons. 1s6 The court emphasized the plain language of the statute
which provides that section 504 applies to "any program receiving federal
assistance" and noted that the purpose of the act, to aid in independent
living and rehabilitation, is the same purpose for prisons.107 "By ensuring
that inmates have meaningful access to prison activities, . . . the goals of
both the [correctional] institution and the Rehabilitation Act are
served." 1 "0
III. THE CASE
A.

The Facts and Procedural History

In 1987 the Alabama Legislature passed a statute that makes HIV disease testing mandatory upon entry for all persons serving time in the
state's correctional facilities. 99 If the first ELISA test was positive, the
prisoner was given another ELISA test and a Western Blot test. If this
series of tests came back positive, the correctional system sent the inmate
to one of two segregated dormitories, Limestone Correctional Facility for
200
males or Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women.
Carmen Harris, an inmate at Tutwiler, filed a complaint challenging
mandatory testing of all inmates and segregation of seropositive inmates.
The district court consolidated similar cases with the complaint Harris
filed. The court certified two classes: the plaintiff's class, consisting of all
inmates or future inmates of the correctional system who presently have
or may contract HIV disease, and another class made up of inmates who
oppose the relief plaintiffs request.20 1 Additionally, two nonseropositive
inmates from the general prison population intervened as defendants.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 562.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added)).
Id. (citing Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976)).
941 F.2d at 1499 n.2 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-11A-17(a) (1990)).
Id. at 1500.
Id.
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Plaintiffs argued that the mandatory testing of all inmates coming into
the correctional system and the subsequent segregation of those inmates
who tested positive violated their First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 02 The district court denied plaintiffs' request for relief on grounds that the
mandatory testing did not amount to a First or Fourth Amendment violation, that insufficient evidence existed to support an Eighth Amendment
claim, that the segregation practice did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that defendants did not violate section 504.203
Plaintiffs appealed citing four grounds. First, plaintiffs challenged the
district court's assertion that no credible evidence existed upon which to
base the Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical
needs. Second, plaintiffs challenged the district court's finding that defendants had not violated their constitutional right to privacy. Third,
plaintiffs challenged the district court's finding that defendants had not
violated section 504. Fourth, plaintiffs challenged the district court's finding that access to the courts had not been denied. 0 4
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion
Eighth Amendment Challenge. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
first addressed the claim that the Alabama Department of Corrections
("DOC") was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs' serious medical
needs.'20 On this issue, the court upheld the district court's findings:
"[Tihe preponderance of the evidence shows no violation of any prisoner's rights to medical or psychological or psychiatric care and no deliberate indifference to any serious medical or psychological need." 6
Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Estelle v. Gamble,207 the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings and summarily rejected plaintiffs' arguments on deliberate indifference. 2" First, plaintiffs
presented expert medical testimony in an attempt to show deliberate indifference. By way of example, the court showed that although some improprieties in the treatment of prisoners may have existed, "the cases at
most evidence isolated incidence of medical malpractice."2 09 The court
noted that "[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional viola202. Id.
203. Id. at 1501 (citing Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1583 (M.D. Ala. 1990)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1504.

206. Id.
207.
208.
209.

429 U.S. 97 (1976).
941 F.2d at 1504.
Id. at 1506.
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tion merely because the victim is a prisoner." 210 The testimony that the
plaintiffs' experts presented called into question many of the treatments

given to seropositive inmates. However, the experts' opinions did not take
into account inmates' lack of cooperation in receiving treatments. 2 1 Even
if the testimony had taken the inmates' noncompliance into account, dif-

fering medical opinions do not warrant constitutional action. 12
Second, plaintiffs argued that insufficient medical staffing in the correc-

tional system showed deliberate indifference.212 Though staffing was
nonexemplary, it satisfied the constitutional standard. The court agreed

with the district court in its conclusions on this argument, but rejected
the district court's reasoning" 'that financial considerations must be considered in determining the reasonableness' of inmates [medical care]."2 1 '
The court acknowledged that insufficient state funding may cause inadequate inmate medical care, but rejected this rationale
because poor states
21

could use it to justify a congtitutional violation. 5
Plaintiffs further argued that the correctional medical staff did not ade-

quately serve the inmates' mental needs. 2 '6 Though plaintiffs' expert testified that he considered the mental health services inadequate, the court
found no constitutional violation.2 1 7 Health care need not be perfect, it

need- only be constitutionally sufficient.' The court acknowledged the
importance of educating the prison population about HIV disease and
counseling seropositive inmates, but did not' believe that any deficiencies
in such education or counseling evidenced a constitutional violation.2 '1
"[H]elping a terminally sick prisoner 'cope' psychologically with various
aspects of a dread physical illness, while therapeutic, may be a more ex-

210. Id. at 1505 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
211. Id. at 1506. By way of example, the court mentioned the case history of an inmate
known as C.D., who in October 1988 began complaining about pain in his ears. After suffering seizures and being prescribed anti-seizure medication, C.D. was treated at Cooper-Green
Hospital for toxoplasmosis, a common HIV disease complication which causes the development of brain abscesses. Doctors administered two drugs for his treatment: sulfadiazene and
pyrimethamine. Two days after the diagnosis, C.D. had yet to receive the prescribed drugs
though the nurses knew of C.D.'s need for the medication. He eventually received the
proper medication. C.D. was then placed on AZT. As part of this treatment, the medical
staff monitored C.D.'s blood count and bone marrow. C.D. objected to this monitoring and
refused to take AZT. Id. at 1506-07.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 84-116.
213. 941 F.2d at 1507.
214. Id. at 1509 (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1577-78 (M.D. Ala.
1990)).
215. Id. (citing Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (1983)).
216. Id. at 1509-10.
217. Id. at 1510.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1511.
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pansive view of0 mental health care than that contemplated by the eighth
amendment.

2 2'

Fourteenth Amendment Challenge. The court addressed plaintiffs' right to privacy challenge and affirmed the district court's finding of
no violation. 221 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that mandatory testing and
segregation disclose disease status, are unnecessary and stigmatizing, and
prevent plaintiffs from choosing their own method of disclosure. 222 The
Eleventh Circuit found that the seropositive inmates retained a constitutional right to privacy in preventing nonconsensual disclosure of their seropositive status.2 2 8 The court nevertheless refused to define precisely the
type of privacy right the inmates retained.224 Though the inmates may
maintain some of their privacy rights, inmates can exercise these rights
only to the extent the rights do not interfere with legitimate penological
interests.'
The court relied heavily on the standard and factors the Supreme
Court enunciated in Turner.2 2 In finding a rational relationship between
the stated goals of "reducing the transmission of HIV infection and reducing the level of violence" and the testing and segregation policy, the
22
court rejected plaintiffs' position that no rational relationship existed. 7
Recognizing an ongoing debate between a mass screening segregative program and an educational program, the court reasoned that it could not
that following a mass screening segregative program
possibly determine
22 8
Was arbitrary.
The court, in continuing its analysis under the Turner test, determined
that no alternative means would allow seropositive inmates to exercise
their privacy rights.229 Unlike most constitutional rights, plaintiffs'
claimed right to privacy is a passive right when defendant can formulate
no alternative affirmative activity. Either the prisoner has HIV disease
and is segregated or not, leaving no middle ground.2 30 The court's inability to place the privacy right in this case on a continuum caused it to
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 1512.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1513.
1513 n.26.
1514 (citing O'Lane v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)).
1515-16 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85-92 (1987)).
1516.
1517 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).
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dismiss this Turner
factor as too problematic to aid in determining a ra23
tional relationship. '

The third Turner factor the court discussed concerned the potential of
a "ripple effect" if plaintiffs' right to privacy claim was actionable.23 2 The
court found that the "ripple effect" could be severe.28

3

Several factors

proved conclusive. First, the presence of non-HIV intervenor-inmates in
the action demonstrated that any reintegration could cause increased
vio84
lence. Second, reintegration would have an impact on guards.3
Finally, the court discussed the fourth Turner factor: the absence or
presence of acceptable alternatives as evidence of rationality."8 The court
could find no acceptable alternatives to Alabama's segregative policy. "To
be sure, alternatives exist.

2 6
3

The court realized that other correctional

systems are trying reintegration of inmates into the general population
combined with education and counseling. "Nevertheless, if the trend
away from mandatory testing and segregation implies that it is perhaps a
more extreme approach to the problem of managing HIV in prisons, we
are not convinced that Alabama's response can yet be dismissed as an
unreasonable, 'exaggerated' one.''23 The Eleventh Circuit further justified
its decision: "when prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have
rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears
that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the
alternative they in fact selected was not an 'exaggerated' response under
Turner.", 8
Section 504 Claim. In addressing plaintiffs' statutory claim, the
court found insufficient evidence and remanded for further findings of
fact.'3 Plaintiffs claimed that the segregation of seropositive inmates violated section 504.240 Because seropositive inmates are separated from the

general prison population in all aspects including housing, recreation, religious services, and family visitation, the inmates have been unable to participate in federally funded programs available to the general prison
population.24'
231.

Id.

232.
233.

Id. at 1518 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 418 (1989)).
Id.

234.

Id.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 1519 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
Id.
Id. at 1527.
Id. (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989)).
Id.
Id, at 1522.
Id, at 1521.
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The Alabama DOC conceded that section 504 applies to prison programs subject to requirements that the individual be handicapped and be
"otherwise qualified."' 4 In analyzing the handicapped or nonhandicapped status of the seropositive inmates, the Eleventh Circuit followed the
recent opinions of members of Congress and forward-thinking courts.'"
Agreeing with the district court, the Eleventh Circuit said that seropositive inmates could qualify'as "handicapped individuals" within the
meaning of section 504" The court based its decision on the implementing regulations of section 504 which provide that a person who is treated
as if he has a disability is handicapped within the meaning of the
statute.""
The court did not affirm the district court's conclusion that plaintiffappellants were not "otherwise qualified.I'M The court refused to endorse
the district court's holding because the district court did not make "individualized inquir[ies] and findings of fact necessary to determine whether
the members of the appellant class [were) 'otherwise qualified' for any of
the programs or activities."
The district court's generalized propositions were not sufficiently specific to support any finding on the issue of
"otherwise qualified.""IM Thus, the court remanded the section 504 claim
for more particular inquiries to determine if reintegration could cause a
substantial health risk or whether defendants could make reasonable accommodations to lessen the health risk. 24"

242.

Id. at 1522.

243.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.

244.

941 F.2d at 1523.

245. Id. at 1523-24 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (1988)); Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs Hosp. Dist., 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990). Congress, as shown in the ADA, has
placed HIV infected persons in, the first category of handicapped people-those whose impairments limit major life activities. See Robert A. Kushen, Asymptomatic Infection with
the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 88 COL. L. REv. 563,
573-74 (1988); Janet Leader, Running from Fear Itself: Analyzing Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS and Other Communicable Diseases Under Section 504 of
the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 23 WILLIAMErTE L. REV. 857, 895-96 (1987).
246.

941 F.2d at 1526.

247.

Id.

248.

Id.

249.

Id. at 1527.
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ANALYSIS 250

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Harris v.Thigpen2" grappled with a complex and morally difficult problem: what to do with inmates infected with HIV disease. In issuing its decision, the Eleventh Circuit maintained a status quo of segregating seropositive inmates despite
the fact that forward-looking educational and prevention programs
designed to fairly protect the rights of all prisoners, seropositive and nonseropositive alike, are replacing segregation programs. 52
In holding that defendants did not violate a Fourteenth Amendment
right to privacy, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on factors enunciated
in Turner v. Safley.2 5 The first Turner factor, a low scrutiny, rationally
related analysis, gives extra deference to prison administrators who are
furthering a legitimate penological objective. 2 ' The Eleventh Circuit
found two objectives: "[1] reducing the transmission of HIV infection and
[2] reducing the level of violence [in the prisons].

' 25 5

Considering these

two objectives separately, the segregation of HIV prisoners clearly satisfies either one.
Under current Alabama law, which tests prisoners only upon entry and
prior to release, 5 segregating infected inmates will not prevent the
spread of HIV disease. At best, segregation will only lessen the spread of
infection. Because of the various problems with the testing conducted, no
one can be sure that all HIV disease infected inmates are segregated. 2 '
250. This Casenote's analysis of Harris v: Thigpen is limited mainly to an analysis of the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning on the issue of right to privacy. A couple of reasons exist for
limiting the analysis. First, the Eighth Amendment issue of deliberate indifference to medical care is largely a factual issue. Based on any given facts, one court may find a constitutional violation, and another court may find no constitutional violation. Second, the court
has not yet decided the section 504 claim. To analyze the merits of the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning on that issue would be premature. The analysis will center on the factors enunciated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), as well as on general arguments concerning the
unworkability of a segregating program.
251. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
252. Recently, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Dakota, and Arizona have dropped their
segregative policies. Tennessee, Wyoming, and Georgia are returning seropositive inmates to
the general prison population. 6 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 18 (Spring 1991). Oregon and
Wisconsin have conducted studies which suggest that voluntary testing combined with effective education is the most effective way of combatting the problem in correctional facilities.
22 NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J. 18 (Winter 1990). Additionally, six states have started issuing
condoms to prisoners even though sex, in prison is illegal. WASHINGTON POST, supra note 51.
253. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 149-61.
254. 482 U.S. at 89.
255. 941 F.2d at 1516.
256. ALA. CODE § 22-11A-17(a) (1990). Furthermore, the statute provides that only those
inmates who are to be incarcerated more than thirty consecutive days be tested. Id.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 27-37.
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False negatives, the latency period of the disease from infection to seropositivity, and the incubation period of the disease create a situation in
which the only way segregation can be sure to prevent the spread of the
HIV disease is to retest all the inmates constantly.108 In poorer states
such as Alabama, this type of testing policy could be cost-prohibitive.119 A
second rationale for segregation is nonconsenual sexual intercourse between male prisoners. While this may be a problem in prisons, the risk of
transmission in these situations can be lessened if prison officials issue
condoms to inmates.
Women pose a different problem for justifying segregation. Currently,
HIV disease can be contracted only through limited means, one being
through fluids passed during sexual intercourse.'"0 Since women cannot
exchange bodily fluids in sexual intercourse, this cannot be a justification
for segregating women.
The second Turner factor provides additional support for determining
that a segregation program is archaic and unconstitutional. Under the
second factor, the court must determine if an alternative means could
adequately protect constitutional rights.261 The Eleventh Circuit found no
alternative means in Harris. An educational and prevention program is
such an alternative. While not foolproof, an education program does not
violate one group's constitutional rights at the expense of another's group.
The third Turner factor appears to be the impetus for Alabama's second penological interest. Under this factor, the court should look to what
effect any accommodation would have on the prison system. If the effect
is great, the accommodation will not be implemented.2 2 Alabama stated
that its segregation policy is designed to prevent violence in the correctional system, specifically violence directed .toward infected inmates .3
Additionally, reintegration could have an adverse effect on the correctional staff who fear infection. While the potential for violence is undoubtedly present, prison officials have an affirmative duty to protect
prisoners from this violence. An aggressive education program could be
the first step in that protection.

258.

See supra text accompanying notes 24-37,

259.

See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.

260.

See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.

261.

See supra text accompanying note 156.

262.

See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.

263. 941 F.2d 1495, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1991).
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CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Harris upheld an Alabama
26
statute allowing the segregation of prisoners infected with HIV disease. 4
Largely basing its decision on a low scrutiny test, which found segregation
rationally related to the prevention of transmission of the disease and
lessening violence,2 the court did not adequately take into account the
enormous strides being made in educating people about the threats of the
disease nor did it adequately take into account the problems associated
with the testing procedure.
THOMAS

264. Id. at 1528.
265. Id. at 1501.
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